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A system of Administrative Courts was set up for the first time in Thailand as an important 
part of the new Thai Constitution of 1997. After dealing with issues raised in undertaking 
comparative analysis, this article traces the background to the introduction of the court, with 
particular reference to the strong influence of the French system of droit administratif in the 
development of the Council of State in Thailand, and in the conception of the current Thai 
system of administrative justice. The discussion proceeds to consider the institutional safe-
guards which were put in place to secure the independence of the Administrative Courts. The 
following sections deal with the characteristics of the court, which are mainly discussed in 
terms of its jurisdictional limits, the grounds set out for its intervention, the remedies it is able 
to award, and its work load. Finally, some of the court’s significant judgments are considered 
in the context of the current constitutional situation in Thailand.  
This article provides an assessment of the Thai Administrative Courts in 
light of recent Thai constitutional reform. In seeking to evaluate these 
characteristics of the new courts, comparisons are made with the adminis-
trative court systems in France and in England.  
 The first section refers to the methodological approach adopted  
in order to embark on a comparative enterprise. In particular, I briefly 
revisit debates concerning the ‘transplantation’ of systems of law between 
one nation and another, in order to see how such concepts might be 
relevant to the present discussion. In the following section, the ground is 
marked out by mentioning the Thai constitutional reform process, relating 
particularly to constitutional oversight and other ‘watchdog’ bodies. The 
next section seeks to trace the ‘genealogy’1 of the Administrative Courts by 
providing historical background for the introduction of administrative law 
in Thailand. The remaining sections examine the Administrative Courts 
themselves. I first consider the question of the independence of these 
courts by examining their institutional status under the Constitution and 
under the law. Next, the most significant characteristics of these courts 
are reviewed from a comparative perspective, before moving on in the 
following part of the discussion to assess their jurisdictional responsibility, 
including the grounds of review under which the Administrative Courts 
operate. The main concern here is to consider how well equipped the 
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Administrative Courts are to fulfil their constitutional role. This study 
mainly seeks to provide an analysis of what we might call the institutional 
framework relating to the Administrative Courts. However, although 
there has been no systematic evaluation of the decided case law, there is a 
provisional discussion of the court’s effectiveness in the final section, 
which is based on the available statistical information and prominent 
reported cases. 
Methods of Comparison 
A study in comparative public law inevitably encounters practical and 
methodological problems. First, at a practical level there has been a heavy 
reliance on translated materials of variable accuracy and fluency. Further, 
the terminology particular to any legal system can present an additional 
obstacle. On occasion it is necessary to leave certain terms in their 
original form with some note or explanation, if no equivalent translation 
is possible (Legrand, 1996: 234). Second, the accepted definition of what  
a subject discipline involves may differ quite fundamentally from one 
nation to another. Comparatists need to start by asking whether they are 
actually comparing like with like. We will soon discover that there are 
separate genealogies which shape national administrative law traditions 
(Legrand, 1996: 148). For example, in England and Wales, the tradition of 
administrative law has often been defined under the influence of the 
Diceyan notion of the ‘rule of law’ as being mainly concerned with the con-
trol function of the courts.2 By way of contrast, Thai administrative law 
has a very different history: it is derived from French administrative law. 
In turn, this connection has shaped its particular genealogy and its 
distinct form, function and jurisdictional scope. 
 Third, it can be claimed that developed and developing nations share 
many problems with respect to the question of how government can be 
controlled in the interests of both the state and its citizens (Brown and 
Bell, 1998: 1). Given the commonality of such problems,3 it would seem to 
follow that comparative analysis can shed much light on the respective 
merits and shortcomings of different constitutional and legal regimes from 
the technical standpoint of their design and their function. Perhaps the 
central question when considering the feasibility of comparative law 
might be to ask whether the technologies of law and constitutionalism  
are transferable at all? Of course, the idea of ‘transplants’ has been a 
recurring concept when looking at legal systems from a comparative 
perspective (Watson, 1976: 79–84). The applicability of transplants can be 
supported to some extent by the observation that one legal system may 
have been modelled on another. There is a clear connection between the 
common law system found in the United Kingdom and the ones that 
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operate in a number of Commonwealth Countries (Harding, 2004: 137–
62). Equally, the Napoleonic Codes originating from France have found 
their way into much of continental Europe and former French colonies 
including Cambodia and Vietnam. Furthermore, as we shall see, the 
French system has provided the basis for Thai administrative law, as it 
did for Thai private law.  
 In the mid-18th century, Montesquieu considered that environmental 
difficulties stood in the way of transplantation from one system of law to 
another (Allison, 2000: 12ff). More recently, Otto Kahn-Freund developed 
the idea of transplants, and he recognised that the degrees of trans-
ferability varied with the type of law under consideration (that is, whether 
private or public) (Kahn-Freud, 1974: 6). His suggestion has been contes-
ted, namely that the problem with transplantation was more difficult at 
the public law end of a continuum, because of the proximity to the organic 
power structures which organise constitutional, legislative, administrative 
and judicial institutions and procedures. It has been pointed out that the 
complexity of these factors taken together do not necessarily form an 
impediment for the comparatist seeking to transplant ideas, and it has 
been argued:  
The 1997 [Thai] Constitution is riddled with implied references to other 
constitutions. Discussions revolved around which of these suited Thai 
conditions and should be inserted in the new Constitution … to confine 
constitutional debate in the way Kahn-Freund would demand would be to 
deny an opportunity to achieve the kind of legality and accountability 
Thailand desperately needs … (Harding, 2000: 112)  
 Rather the point is that any such study needs to take account of many 
crucial variables in the form of similarities and differences in both the 
arrangements for the separation of powers between state institutions, and 
the distribution of power between organised groups at many different 
levels, including economic interests, consumers, trade unions and so on. 
Indeed, a discussion of any regime of public law must relate to the social, 
political, economic and historical context (Loughlin, 1992: 4). The task of 
comparative analysis is far from straightforward because of fundamental 
distinctions that have to be recognised, not only in respect to the tradition 
of law, but also concerning the nature of the state itself. Perhaps the most 
obvious problem for any discussion of aspects of the Thai Constitution 
from a comparative angle is that Thailand does not share the same cul-
ture and history as European nations, and although it might be broadly 
designated as having a constitutional monarchy with a democratically 
elected government, it has a radically different political tradition. For 
example, there were 16 different constitutions during the course of the 
20th century, and the military forcibly took over control of government at 
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intervals following the Second World War. In consequence, the institu-
tions of democratic government are not anchored in the same way as they 
are in some European nations with longer traditions of democracy.  
 For the study in hand, it will be suggested at a broad level of genera-
lity that a common concern can be identified, namely, the attempt to 
analyse the distribution, exercise and containment of state power, an 
objective that has been considered only attainable through the modifi-
cation of state institutions and the introduction of regulatory mechanisms. 
This type of analysis has been recognised as a central concern of contem-
porary constitutionalism, although such analysis may be undertaken in 
different ways (see, eg, Morison and Livingstone, 1995). In view of so 
much evidence of the global interaction of ideas in an electronic age, it 
seems that the concept of ‘transplants’ needs to be revised and updated. 
Constitution-making should be seen rather as an eclectic process 
involving an importation of influences.4 Certainly in the field of public 
law, a more useful approach in considering the formulation and develop-
ment of law and constitutions would be to identify an absorption of 
influences and a recognition that a ‘process of cross-fertilisation’ takes 
place and does so in a dynamic manner (Bell, 1998: 147; Oliver, 1999: 
117ff; also Van Caenegem, 1995). 
The Thai Constitutional Context 
The Thai Constitution which came into force on 11 October 1997 is widely 
regarded as the most ambitious step so far in establishing the institu-
tional basis for a democratic system of government in Thailand. As one 
commentator puts it: ‘The 1997 constitution represents a revolution in 
Thai politics. It was a bold attempt at conferring greater power to  
the Thai people than had ever been granted before’ (Chambers, 2002: 16). 
It was promulgated following a special process during which the Consti-
tution Drafting Assembly conducted widespread consultation on a 
nationwide basis. The result was a Constitution that introduced sweeping 
changes which affected the main institutions ranging from parliament, 
government and the courts. For example, the Constitution modified the 
electoral system and the composition of both houses of the Thai 
parliament. The constitution also introduced greater transparency and 
established a reformulated Constitutional Court.  
 Apart from recasting the shape of the main institutions, a prime 
objective was to tackle corruption and to protect basic human rights more 
effectively. To achieve these ends, a new set of independent organisations 
were set up to oversee its operation. Indeed, the inclusion of mechanisms 
for monitoring and enforcing the main provisions is a distinctive charac-
teristic of the 1997 Constitution. For example, the Election Commission, 
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the National Counter-Corruption Commission and the State Audit 
Commission have been designed to tackle abuses associated with the 
political process. In the field of citizen rights, the National Human Rights 
Commission and Ombudsman were designated to play important roles.  
 The 1997 Constitution includes the specially formulated features 
mentioned above to deal with a perceived democratic deficit in a number 
of areas, but an equally important characteristic of the new Constitution 
is the intention of establishing a clear separation of powers between the 
executive branch and the judicial branch. In general terms, the judiciary 
have been kept separate from, and independent of, the Ministry of Justice. 
 In delineating the position of the Administrative Courts it is im-
portant to be aware of their jurisdictional scope in relation to the 
Constitutional Court and other courts. With regard to constitutional 
issues, the 1997 Constitution established a Constitutional Court which 
consists of a President and 14 judges. Normally a quorum of nine judges 
presides over cases that come before it (Thai Constitution, s 255; Office of 
the Constitutional Court, 2003). The Constitutional Court is responsible 
for hearing challenges to draft legislation, statutes and regulations on the 
grounds of unconstitutionality (Thai Constitution, ss 262–263). The court 
also determines matters of overlapping authority between official bodies 
under s 266 and is designed to operate as a constitutional safeguard, par-
ticularly in relation to the protection of civil liberties and human rights.5 
As a judicial body with jurisdiction over many constitutional issues it is 
vested with formidable powers,6 some of which are comparable to those 
exercised by the United States Supreme Court.7 In such a capacity, the 
Thai Constitutional Court is most exposed to political criticism and 
censure.8 Thailand has a system of criminal and civil courts operating in 
their respective fields and, further, the Administrative Courts have no 
jurisdiction over matters triable by other specialist courts,9 matters of 
military discipline and those falling under the remit of the Judicial 
Commission.10 Where there is a dispute as to the jurisdictional limits of 
the Administrative Court, the outcome is determined by a special com-
mittee comprising the President of the Supreme Court of Justice, the 
President of the Supreme Administrative Court and the President of the 
other court involved (Thai Constitution, s 248). 
France, England and the Genealogy of the Thai 
Administrative Court 
Thailand adopted a continental system of law inspired by France and 
Belgium as part of the programs of intense reform the nation experienced 
during the course of the 19th century (Wyatt, 1991: 192, 210). In 
consequence, it is not surprising that the French system of droit 
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administratif has served as the main model for the Thai Administrative 
Courts.11 It can be argued that the character of the Administrative Court 
has been largely determined by this genealogy, although features relating 
to the English common law are also relevant to any analysis. Turning 
briefly to France first, it is important to remember that the Conseil 
d’Etat12 is not really an ordinary court but the head of a separate hierar-
chy of special Administrative Courts (Brown and Bell, 1998: 6). These 
special Administrative Courts have a jurisdiction which overlaps with 
that of the civil courts and administrative tribunals in the United 
Kingdom. It is a body that originated from the administration because:  
[T]here was no appeal against bad administrative decisions. Napoleon, 
who established the Conseil d’Etat under the Constitution of 1799 as a 
powerful administrative body … gave to it, as one of its functions, the 
task of hearing administrative appeals. Since it was not technically a 
court, it could do so. (Burchett, 1995: 977) 
The Conseil d’Etat in France as it developed demonstrated a capacity for 
judicial independence. And despite Dicey’s assertions to the contrary 
(Burchett, 1995: 978), it managed to impose a principle of legality by 
assuming a role overseeing the administrative process. This role was all 
the more apparent because the ordinary courts were prevented from 
having jurisdiction in this area. It originated as a means for petitioning 
the Crown, but later (1872) acquired the power to issue unenforceable 
judgments:  
In the second half of the nineteenth century and in the early twentieth 
century, reformist politicians, Conseillers d’Etat and doctrinal writers, …, 
attributed to the state administrative qualities of potential irrespon-
sibility and abusiveness that rendered legal controls justifiable … they 
perceived a centralized and, therefore, distinct and identifiable adminis-
tration that could be subject to a distinct body of law. (Allison, 2000: 55)  
In turn, this led to the emergence of identifiable notions of public power 
and public service supported by an emergent regime of public law which 
could serve as a corrective to a potentially irresponsible and abusive 
administration.  
 The contrast has often been made between France and England, 
where the writings of AV Dicey were, and still are, very influential. 
Dicey’s mission in developing his doctrine of parliamentary sovereignty 
and the rule of law was to enhance ‘the peculiarities of the English’ 
(Thompson, 1965) and to allow the English approach to be distinguished 
from, and propagated as being superior to, that of France (Taggart, 2003: 
107). Dicey (in his early work particularly) was unjustifiably critical of the 
French system for incorporating the post-revolutionary Napoleonic Codes, 
creating what he claimed to be a relatively authoritarian centralised state, 
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together with what he regarded as a servile system of administrative law 
(the droit administratif) (Jowell, 2004), which he wrongly considered 
lacked any meaningful separation of powers (Allison, 2000: 19).  
 As Loughlin points out:  
By administrative law Dicey meant a special body of rules, institutions 
and procedures … inimical to the rule of law … because it undermined 
the principles of equality and universality, it placed the state in a privi-
leged position and would therefore threaten the historic achievement of 
bringing the crown under the rule of law and by establishing special 
courts it infringed the principle of separation of judicial and ministerial 
powers. (Loughlin, 1992: 145) 
The idea of a self-correcting democracy recognised that Parliament sets a 
framework of general rules for society. The executive is required to govern 
within those rules while an independent judiciary resolve disputes over 
the meaning of the rules. In particular, the courts are charged with 
keeping the executive within the boundaries of the law (Craig, 1990: 15ff). 
These ideas were originally formulated before the introduction of univer-
sal suffrage and the pressure for social reform.  
 It is somewhat ironic that, despite the fact that Dicey was strongly 
opposed to the use of law as an instrument of social policy, the 20th 
century welfare state, erected, mainly between 1914 and 1951, largely 
depended on reforming statutes, administered by legions of officials 
populating government departments and overseen by a battery of 
administrative tribunals.13 A government with a majority in the House of 
Commons is invariably able to carry through its legislative objectives, 
with the result that concerns have been increasingly expressed over 
trends towards executive dominance, sometimes referred to as ‘elective 
dictatorship’.  
 Of course, the expanded scope of judicial review, especially since the 
late 1960s, has been regarded as an emerging constraint on executive 
power (Jowell, 2003: 390ff). The fact that England and Wales (and also 
Scotland and Northern Ireland. as part of their distinct legal systems) 
have a system of administrative law with a dedicated court equipped with 
specially designed remedies to hear judicial review cases can be regarded 
as significant constitutional development (Cane, 2004; Leyland and 
Anthony, 2005; Craig, 2003; Wade and Forsyth, 2004). To some extent 
these courts have emerged as a counterweight to the burgeoning execu-
tive.14 
 During the course of the 19th century, under the rule of ‘Mongkut’ 
(King Rama IV: 1851–68) and ‘Chulalongkorn’ (King Rama V: 1868-1910), 
Thailand was subject to a program of modernisation and reform which 
touched many areas of Thai society, including politics and law. In 
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particular, King Rama V attempted to use the law as an instrument with 
which to oppose the personal influence and corruption which surrounded 
the court. He was far sighted enough to recognise that it was through the 
introduction of a ‘Principle of Legality’ comparable to that evolving in 
France under the droit administratif that this objective could be achieved. 
Such a principle had a role to play by bringing the performance of every 
duty under the law. To achieve this end, a Council of State was briefly 
established following a European visit by the Thai King in the 1870s. 
However, the Council was often circumvented, with the result that  
the new body rapidly became redundant, and so the King eventually com-
manded the repeal of the Act on the Council of State BE 2417 in 1893 (BE 
2437). 
 The inspiration for the modern system of administrative law in Thai-
land is usually credited to Pridi Phanomyong, a Thai politician, professor 
and judge of exceptional ability and energy (see generally Baker and 
Phongpaichit, 2000). Pridi trained in Paris and then returned to Bangkok 
where he was instrumental in introducing the teaching of administrative 
law as part of the curriculum for lawyers at the Ministry of Justice Law 
School in the years following his return from France. In fact, the 
curriculum he introduced concentrated on constitutional matters such as 
the form of the state and the rights and liberties of individuals.15 Pridi 
was a major player at the point when absolute monarchy was replaced by 
early forms of constitutionalism (Baker and Phongpaichit, 2005: 121ff). 
The Council of State was re-established by the Act on the Council of State 
BE 2476 (CE 1933) and it was intended to perform the functions which 
had previously been exercised by the Advisory Agency of the State in the 
reign of King Rama V. The duties of the Law Drafting Department were 
transferred to the Council of State in CE 1933. The same body was also 
intended by Pridi to function as an Administrative Court to serve Thai 
citizens. Such a court could be petitioned to do justice against the 
government and state agencies (Bhalakula, 2001:14). However, the term 
‘administrative court’ was not officially used.  
 At this point there were already certain options open to an aggrieved 
citizen. A case could be taken against an administrative official in the 
ordinary courts. A right of appeal to a court against the administrative act 
or order might be available. A petition could be issued against the 
superior of a administrative official if wrongdoing was suspected. Finally, 
it was possible to petition the King directly (Bhalakula, 2001: 9). The 
introduction of administrative law meant that, if an administrative order 
was wrong, a process of petitioning to the Council of State would become 
available. In order to perform these dual functions, the staff of the Council 
of State were divided into two categories: law councillors, whose primary 
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function was statutory drafting; and petition councillors, who were entrus-
ted to adjudicate administrative cases as prescribed by law (Bhalakula, 
2001: 13). From the 1930s, when this upheaval was taking place, until 
recently, it would have been costly to introduce an Administrative Court 
but, above all, there was well-orchestrated opposition from prominent 
judges to the introduction of a new administrative law jurisdiction.16 
Accordingly, the existing system of administrative appeals was expanded 
into the Petition Council of the Office of State to deal with the adminis-
trative cases that arose.  
 The 1997 Constitution provided for the introduction of the system of 
Administrative Courts in addition to the ordinary courts.17 The Adminis-
trative Courts were designed to fill a particular gap in the grievance chain 
by offering full legal redress against official bodies. They were set up by 
statute in 1999 (Act on the Establishment of Administrative Courts and 
Administrative Courts Procedure BE 2542 (1999) (the 1999 Act) and began 
operating in 2001, replacing the Petition Council of the Council of State.18 
The new courts are based on a two-tier system: the Supreme Adminis-
trative Court and Administrative Courts of First Instance, of which there 
are two – the Central Administrative Court (for Bangkok and provinces 
local to Bangkok) and the Regional Administrative Courts (1999 Act, s 7). 
However, the characteristics of the courts and the limits of their 
jurisdiction can be distinguished from the ordinary courts and from other 
means of redress that are available under the Constitution. The Supreme 
Administrative Court, apart from acting as an appellate court, by hearing 
appeals from judgments of the Administrative Court of first instance, also 
exercises a jurisdiction that is directed at issues relating to the operation 
of central government. For example, it has competence to try cases 
concerning the legality of Royal Decrees or by-laws issued by the Council 
of Ministers. It also tries cases involving disputes in relation to decisions 
of a quasi-judicial council (as prescribed by the general assembly of judges 
of the Supreme Court) (1999 Act, s 11). 
The Independence of the Administrative Courts 
An effective separation of powers between the executive and judicial bran-
ches depends on establishing a strong degree of judicial independence,  
and there has already been brief mention of the problems encountered by 
the Thai Constitutional Court in making decisions which carried far-
reaching political consequences. In Thailand, judicial independence has 
been recognised as a constitutional imperative since the courts’ structure 
was introduced in 1908, and public protest has resulted from attempts to 
undermine such independence, even during periods of military rule.19 
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  What do I mean by judicial independence in this administrative law 
context? The originators of modern conceptualisations of separation of 
powers sought to conceive a system of checks that would ensure that 
power vested in governors cannot be turned to personal advantage and 
that the personalised rule by men would be replaced by the impersonal 
rule of rules (Loughlin, 2000: 183). It was further recognised that this 
required ‘an independent judiciary … acting as a bulwark against execu-
tive power. It is this aspect of the rule of law which is critical in distin-
guishing between liberal and despotic regimes’. In practical terms, the 
result is that the judiciary require first: ‘a set of relatively clear and 
general rules which can establish an impartial system and, secondly, 
independence to apply the law without fear or favour’ (Loughlin, 2000: 
185). There are a number of ways in which judicial independence is 
relevant. In a macro-constitutional sense, this independence is most 
apparent when the judicial branch is seen to be separated from, and thus 
independent of, the executive branch. Since under most constitutional and 
legal provisions in most nations judicial appointments have to be 
approved by the executive branch at some point, and the judiciary are 
remunerated from public funds, it is obvious that completely isolating the 
judicial branch from political and economic considerations is never 
entirely straightforward.20  
 The 1997 Thai Constitution, coupled with the legislation introducing 
the Administrative Courts, includes elaborate provisions to establish  
the independence of the court’s judges (1999 Act, ss 12–30). The court 
administration is clearly separated from the executive and made inde-
pendent of any government department (Thai Constitution, s 280). A 
Judicial Commission of the Administrative Courts is responsible for 
disciplinary matters and promotion. Any resolutions for dismissal, for 
malfeasance in office, gross disciplinary breach or imprisonment for a 
serious offence (s 23) can only go ahead after an investigation by a 
specially formed committee comprising, among others, four judges of the 
Supreme Administrative Court has been completed, and the committee 
has reported on the matter (1999 Act, s 23).  
 Important safeguards have been set in place in a number of ways to 
guarantee that the Administrative Courts are staffed by a cohort of 
professional judges. Judges are appointed to the Administrative Court by 
the Judicial Commission of the Administrative Courts until their retire-
ment. The salaries of judges are protected (Thai Constitution, s 253, and 
1999 Act, s 30). Judges cannot be taken off a case once they have been 
assigned to it. The requirements for appointment to the court are rigorous; 
in order to be nominated as an Administrative Court judge, candidates 
must be Thai nationals over 35 with ‘appropriate academic qualifications’. 
In addition, they must, as in France, have ‘relevant experience’.21 There 
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are complex procedures for the dismissal of judges which are placed in the 
hands of a judicial commission (1999 Act, s 24). For the Supreme Adminis-
trative Court, the age limit is 45 and candidates must have served as a 
law councillor, petition councillor or councillor of state.22 Conflicts of 
interest are prohibited under s 14.23  
 These stringent requirements limit the pool of possible appointees to 
suitably qualified candidates. Furthermore, administrative judges are 
specialists who only hear cases in the Administrative Courts.  
 The system thus differs from the situation in England and Wales, 
where the panel of High Court judges who staff the Administrative Court 
have legal training and experience but are not specialists in public 
administration, and where these judges for part of the year will also hear 
a range of cases with entirely different subject-matter as part of their 
assigned workload.  
 In order to form a professional cadre of judges who are unlikely to be 
tempted into corrupt practices and, at the same time, attract candidates of 
sufficiently high calibre, it is essential that incumbents are adequately 
remunerated. The salary levels for Administrative Court judges at 
Bt 550,200 pa (£8500 sterling) and Supreme Court judges at Bt 709,080 
pa (£11,000 sterling) may appear relatively modest by European stan-
dards, but these figures represent a substantial salary in terms of the cost 
of living and the levels paid in the public domain to high-ranking Thai 
officials.24 Nevertheless, public sector salaries are a sensitive subject in 
Thailand and it should be stressed that the alleged ‘self-award’ of pay 
increases by independent watchdog bodies without obtaining parliamen-
tary approval (including the Constitutional Court and the Administrative 
Courts) has been subject to far-reaching and continuing controversy and 
this has encouraged an emerging scepticism over the constitutional reform 
program (see, eg, The Nation, 25 October 2004).  
 Susceptibility to political interference crops up at a higher stage in 
the appointments process, because the appointment of President of the 
Supreme Administrative Court requires that a candidate be first nomi-
nated by the Commission, after which approval by the Senate is required 
before the name is submitted to the King for final approval (Thai Consti-
tution, s 278). At this stage, interference might be possible in the form of 
opposition to particular candidates from private individuals or business 
interests exerting an influence. For example, a nominated candidate with 
a reputation for protecting the natural environment could find resistance 
from businesses which consider their interests might be affected by 
environmentally friendly judgments. Cases in the Administrative Courts 
of first instance are heard by a panel of three judges and in the Supreme 
Administrative Court by five judges (1999 Act, s 54). 
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Characteristics of the Thai Administrative Courts  
It is commonly assumed that Administrative Courts are fundamentally 
concerned with the accountability of public bodies and the containment of 
public power, as well as having other responsibilities, for example, over 
administrative contracts and tort claims against public bodies. Given this 
assumption, the reach of any public law jurisdiction becomes a question of 
crucial importance (Hunt, 1997). A separate public law jurisdiction has 
been justified on the basis that the state should have a monopoly over the 
exercise of certain types of coercive power; in particular, the creation and 
enforcement of laws relating to the capacity of the state to act as an 
instrument of social regulation (Bamforth, 1997: 151). Thailand’s French 
connection25 has contributed to the local conceptualisation of a distinct 
public law which is associated with designing state organisations; ascri-
bing varying degrees of importance to state agencies and state officials in 
regard to members of the public; and formulating criteria and measures 
for controlling the discharge of state organs and officials (Bhalakula, 2003: 
19). In many European nations, it has been increasingly recognised that 
any public/private distinction is made more problematic with the emer-
gence of a ‘contracting state’ in which there is expanding private sector 
involvement, for example, in the delivery of public services formerly 
provided by government and local government (Cane, 2003: 248). As well 
as the privatisation of formerly state-run industries, there is also a 
reliance on private companies to construct and manage many publicly 
financed enterprises (Harden, 1992). Thailand is a nation which has also 
seen trends towards a contracting state, and the Thai Administrative 
Courts have been introduced as the most potent constitutional mechanism 
designed to regulate the exercise of these aspects of public power. In 
consequence, a restricted definition of what constitutes ‘public law 
matters’ falling under the ambit of the Administrative Court would limit 
the application of public law remedies and exclude judicial supervision 
over functions formerly exercised by the state, which are now manifest in 
private form (Hunt, 1997: 23). 
 How then do the courts approach the task of determining their 
jurisdictional boundaries? In assessing a claim, the court must decide 
whether the contested matter has a sufficient public law dimension to fall 
under its jurisdiction.26 In cases where this issue is contestable, the judge 
will consider: (1) whether the body/enterprise/individual is providing a 
public service; and (2) whether a public power is being exercised. The test 
employed seeks to ascertain if a power has been granted that would not be 
granted or exercised in the private sector; and (3) whether the body/ 
enterprise or individual is exercising a public service function.27 The 
reported case law suggests that the courts have defined public in a broad 
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sense. For example, the court has heard cases involving privatised state 
enterprises that provide a universal service and has ruled that the 
Telephone Organisation of Thailand remains an administrative agency 
subject to the jurisdiction of the Administrative Courts. The role of the 
Tribunal des Conflits in deciding contested matters of jurisdiction is 
closely replicated by the Thai Jurisdictional Conflict Tribunal, which 
adjudicates when such disputes arise in the Thai legal context (Red Case 
Nos 1733–1734/2002). By way of comparison, it is worth remembering 
that the major justification for the exclusivity principle as part of the 
modern law of judicial review in England and Wales was the introduction 
of both a special procedure and specially designed remedies.28 
 Turning next to remedies, it is argued by Professors Harlow and 
Rawlings in their authoritative study that ‘[o]ne of the most important 
aspects of grievance machinery is that it should provide effective redress’ 
(Harlow and Rawlings, 1997: 560). Although the granting of a remedy in 
judicial review proceedings is discretionary in England and Wales, the 
point to stress is that the system of judicial review has been constructed 
around the remedies that were available. In particular, the courts  
were equipped with the ancient prerogative orders which allowed unlaw-
ful decisions of public bodies to be quashed; prevented bodies from taking 
decisions which were deemed unlawful; or commanded them to act where 
they were neglecting to perform a lawful duty.29 The Thai Administrative 
Court is in possession of formidable powers when it comes to granting 
remedies (1999 Act, s 72) and many of the remedies it is able to award are 
tailored to suit an administrative law context.  
 The court can issue a decree revoking a by-law or an order30 and it 
can revoke an act in whole or part where it is alleged that an adminis-
trative agency or state official has done an unlawful act under s 9(1) of the 
1999 Act. Furthermore, the court can direct whether any such decree will 
have retrospective or non-retrospective effect. In addition, the Adminis-
trative Courts have powers which roughly correspond to the mandatory 
orders and injunctive relief available to the English courts: they are 
granted powers to order the performance of a duty or order a person to act 
or to refrain from an act in compliance with the law. Additionally, the 
court has powers to order the payment of money or the delivery of 
property. The Thai system departs from the French most obviously in  
the way these far-reaching powers are set out. The decisions of the French 
administrative courts were normally obeyed without any need for 
enforcement but reforms were introduced to allow a follow up to 
judgments where a decision has not been implemented, for example, 
astreinte.31 The lack of remedy has been regarded as a perceived weakness 
(Brown and Bell, 1998: 114). 
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 In Thailand, as in France under droit administratif, there is an 
inquisitorial style of court procedure. It is specified that in the process of 
trial and adjudication, the court has the power to inquire into the facts as 
is appropriate (Rule of the General Assembly of the Judges of the 
Supreme Administrative Court on Administrative Court Procedure (2000), 
cl 50)). This procedure requires the judge to conduct investigations to 
ascertain the accuracy of the facts of the case (inexactitude des fait) and he 
or she is expected to draw the correct inferences from these facts.32 At a 
preliminary stage, a judge is put in charge of the case in order to consider 
any statements and documentary evidence submitted, the explanations of 
the parties and any other relevant facts. A memorandum is prepared with 
an opinion from the investigating judge; this is submitted to the division, 
who decide whether the matter can proceed further.33 If the matter goes to 
trial, another judge is made responsible for managing the case, which 
then requires an exchange of evidence so that both parties have full 
knowledge of the contested facts. At this stage, the court has formidable 
powers it can use against public bodies which fail to respond when the 
judge is conducting his or her fact-finding role (1999 Act, s 57).34 When a 
case finally goes to trial, the parties are allowed to make statements and 
call witnesses; however, this is done without incorporating the adversarial 
style of routine examination and cross-examination.35 
 It has been emphasised that Thailand has a continental system based 
on legal codes, which means that case law has a different status in 
comparison with a common law system, where important decisions are 
reported in detail and the higher courts bind the lower courts on decided 
questions of law. In reaching a decision, judges in the Thai Administrative 
Courts are not bound by a doctrine of binding precedent; however, the 
judge is required to refer to any decided cases with similar facts. Any such 
decisions will be regarded as persuasive authority, but they are not 
binding. Moreover, the Administrative Court of first instance is not bound 
by the judgments of the appellate courts. A Supreme Court judgment can 
be disregarded in the Administrative Court, if the judge has reasons to 
disagree with the judgment reached in the superior court; however, again, 
the relevant precedent must be referred to in the course of arriving at the 
decision. Omission to make the appropriate reference would be a prima 
facie ground of appeal and would be regarded as a neglect of duty by the 
judge. Achieving consistency in decision-making may become an increa-
sing problem in the absence of a settled doctrine of precedent: in France, 
for example, the reforms of 1953 required the decisions of the Conseil 
d’Etat to be circulated and for a system of inspection to be introduced to 
achieve greater uniformity (Brown and Bell, 1998: 124). 
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Jurisdiction and Grounds of Intervention  
As we have already seen, the Thai Administrative Court and the Supreme 
Administrative Court have a wide jurisdiction over administrative 
matters. The 1999 Act states that the court can hear cases involving 
disputes in relation to the matters prescribed by the law to be under the 
jurisdiction of Administrative Courts (1999 Act, s 9(6)), and it also gives 
the court jurisdiction over administrative contracts (1999 Act, s 9(4)) (this 
is discussed further below). A substantial case load over the initial period 
indicates that there was a gap that needed to be filled by the new court.36 
However, the Thai Administrative Court has clearly circumscribed limits 
to its jurisdiction. But first we need to deal with the question of merits 
review. The connection with France is worth mentioning on this question 
before we proceed with more discussion of the grounds, since the droit 
administratif has recognised that decision-makers are frequently vested 
with discretionary powers in the public domain and, if such powers are 
exercised lawfully, there is no opportunity for judicial intervention. In 
other words, a principle has long been established that decisions cannot 
generally be challenged on merits grounds alone (l’opportunité). There is 
every indication that Thai Administrative Courts are very well aware of 
the dangers of stepping into the shoes of the executive and are unwilling 
to take decisions on a merits basis. Although the very general ground of 
‘bad faith’ is mentioned, the Act itself contains no reference to a threshold 
equivalent to the Wednesbury/Irrationality test (Associated Provincial 
Picture Houses Ltd v Wednesbury Corporation [1948] 1 KB 223) to be 
applied in order to determine when intervention is possible.  
 In regard to challenging administrative decisions, the Administrative 
Court may be regarded as a remedy of last resort that will only be 
available if other avenues of redress have been exhausted.37 Following an 
application to the court, and before the matter proceeds to trial, there is 
judicial discretion in deciding whether to proceed with a case.38 In order to 
establish whether the court is in a position to intervene, the concepts  
of objective legality and subjective legality are applied by the judge. 
Objective legality looks at whether the body concerned has a legal founda-
tion for its actions. This approach has close parallels to the concept of 
illegality as part of the ultra vires principle, where attention is directed to 
the type of power in the hands of the decision-maker in order to see if the 
power has been exceeded. On the other hand, subjective illegality seeks to 
assess the situation by establishing whether the rights of the claimant/ 
plaintiff have been directly impinged upon by the actions of an official or 
of a public authority.  
 It will be apparent from the discussion that follows that the Thai 
Administrative Courts are empowered to deal with comparable forms of 
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illegality on the part of administrative bodies or state officials,39 but that 
the grounds for intervention in dealing with matters of illegality do not 
exactly mirror those under the droit administratif or those developed by 
the common law under the ultra vires principle.  
 Turning first to the grounds defined under the Act, we find that they 
have many elements in common. First, a challenge is possible against  
a public body for ‘acting without or beyond the scope of its powers  
and duties’. This is a ground which almost corresponds under droit 
administratif to incompetence, in the sense that the decision-maker is 
acting without lawful authority.40 It would seem to cover the ground of 
l’inexistence which is ‘where a decision lacks an essential component’ 
(Birkinshaw, 2003: 129). Exceeding the scope of powers and duties would 
constitute a form of ‘illegality’ under the common law categories identified 
by Lord Diplock in Council of Civil Service Unions v Minister for the Civil 
Service [1985] AC 372 (GCHQ case) and it is broadly equivalent to what 
has been termed simple ultra vires. The basis for any such challenge is 
that a decision-maker has acted in excess of their powers or has exercised a 
power that they do not possess (Attorney-General v Fulham Corporation 
[1921] 1 Ch 440; Congreve v Home Office [1976] 1 All ER 697).  
 Second, the Act provides under the same sub-section that the courts 
may intervene if a public body behaves ‘inconsistently with the law’. This 
might be understood in terms of acting at variance with a law or frus-
trating the legislative purpose. Although not expressed in quite the same 
terms, ‘inconsistently with the law’ could be equated under the common 
law with an implied duty recognised by the courts to promote the purpose 
under the Act.41 The purpose may be found to be improper because it fails 
to match the purpose set out under the law. Also, inconsistency with the 
law might be caused by the failure of a decision-maker exercising a 
discretion to take into account relevant considerations, or, alternatively, 
the fact that he or she has taken account of irrelevant considerations.  
 In a somewhat different sense, consistency is generally regarded as a 
principle of good administration (Steyn, 1977) and it clearly overlaps with 
the related principle of legitimate expectation, based on the idea of legal 
certainty. Among other things, legitimate expectation requires decision-
makers to act in conformity with the procedures they set in place. Consis-
tency has been interpreted to suggest equal treatment to all comers. 
Expressed in the words of Lord Donaldson, ‘it is a cardinal principle of 
good administration that all persons who are in a similar position shall be 
treated similarly’ (R v Hertfordshire CC, ex p Cheung, The Times, 4 April 
1986). However, given the provisions of the 1997 Constitution, it is not 
surprising that ‘unfair discrimination’ is explicitly recognised as a self-
standing ground of review in its own right that will be construed in 
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conjunction with art 30.42 We can see a parallel here as the Constitution 
becomes a point of reference in rather the same way as the European 
Community (EC) Treaty has become for member states. The principle of 
equality or non-discrimination is recognised as a principle of German 
administrative law,43 and it has been developed by the European Court of 
Justice (ECJ) to fill gaps and aid interpretation with reference to the EC 
Treaty art 12 (prohibiting discrimination on the grounds of nationality) 
and art 13 (appropriate action to combat discrimination based on sex, 
racial or ethnic origin, religion or belief, disability, age, or sexual orien-
tation) (Anthony, 2002: 106). The domestic courts of member states are 
required to adopt a stance that recognises the treaty obligations coupled 
with the jurisprudence of the ECJ when a discrimination issue comes 
before them. The capacity of the Thai Administrative courts to intervene 
to correct unfair discrimination represents a significant mechanism for 
the enforcement of the equivalent constitutional principle.44  
 Third, the Thai Administrative Court is empowered to intervene 
where it is alleged there has been conduct ‘amounting to undue exercise of 
discretion’. In regard to droit administratif it has been explained that the 
scope for intervention under this aspect of violation de la loi45 will depend 
on whether the administrator under a statutory regime has no discretion, 
absolute discretion or limited discretion. This is where ‘the administrative 
judge moves on to examine the actual contents of the administrative act 
itself in order to decide whether it conforms with the legal conditions set 
upon administrative action in a particular case’.46 Under the common law 
there have been many judicial pronouncements asserting that discretion 
in an administrative law context is seldom, if ever, completely ‘unfet-
tered’47 and that a discretion has to be construed within the statutory 
context. Moreover, it has been established under the common law that a 
decision-maker conferred with a wide discretionary power must demon-
strate that such power has been exercised, even where the discretion is 
expressed in the broadest subjective language.48  
 Fourth, actions of public bodies can be challenged on procedural, as 
well as substantive, grounds. Section 9(1) provides that inconsistency can 
be not only with the law but with ‘the form, process or procedure which is 
a material requirement’. The 1999 Act thereby introduces a ground of 
review closely related under droit administratif to vice de forme, a ground 
of review which includes any breach of fair procedure. Under this head 
can be included a general right to a fair hearing, proper notice, adequate 
consultation and the right to representation.49 An inconsistency judged in 
respect of form, process or procedure is a ground that has been recognised 
by the common law. ‘Procedural impropriety’, for example, was set out as 
one of the three main grounds of judicial review by Lord Diplock in the 
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GCHQ case. In the same case, Lord Roskill preferred to define the 
requirement as ‘the duty to act fairly’, rather than the term ‘natural 
justice’, a duty demanding fairness ‘in all the circumstances’. It is worth 
noting that the common law rules of natural justice/fairness have 
developed to include the principle of legitimate expectation, both in terms 
of procedures and, in certain limited circumstances, substantive outcomes. 
This is a concept borrowed from German administrative law that has an 
established place in EU law, although the principle has not yet been 
recognised by the Conseil D’Etat.  
 The Thai Administrative Court has jurisdiction allowing it to oversee 
the proper functioning of the administration (Brown and Bell, 1998: 56, 
82).50 An application can be made to the court over an alleged neglect of 
duty or unreasonable delay.51 Equally, the court can be required to 
adjudicate over a ‘wrongful act or other liability’52 associated with the 
administration or state official in the discharge of legal duties.53 In this 
sense the Administrative Court has a jurisdiction which potentially over-
laps with that of the Ombudsman. Indeed, the ombudsman is specifically 
empowered to refer matters to the court if, in the course of an investi-
gation, he believes that any by-law or act of an administrative agency is 
unlawful.54 Moreover, an official of the Office of the Ombudsman may take 
up a case on his own behalf in the Administrative Courts. In this sense, 
the Administrative Court can be regarded as a body which lines up 
alongside the other organs of the state designed to act as watchdog bodies 
at a number of different levels. Causing unnecessary process or excessive 
burden to the public is recognised as a ground of review in its own right. 
Additionally, a matter can be referred to the court by an administrative 
agency or state official to force a person or body to do a particular act 
prescribed by law or to prevent them from acting contrary to the law.55 
 Having looked briefly at the grounds of review I end this section by 
noting that the English Administrative Court deals only with judicial 
review and, as a result, polices rather different territory. It has no com-
petence concerning ‘wrongful acts’ in general. Perhaps the nearest 
equivalent is the tort of misfeasance in public office (which comes under 
the jurisdiction of the ordinary courts),56 but cases in this area are 
extremely rare.57  
Administrative Contracts 
The Thai Administrative Courts took over the jurisdiction previously 
exercised by the Court of Justice and the Petition Council for disputes 
relating to administrative contracts.58 The introduction of the Adminis-
trative Court has established a system of parallel courts, thus providing 
further evidence of French influence (Bhalakula, 2003). This jurisdiction 
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incorporates a public–private law distinction that extends to contracting 
with the public sector.  
 In essence, Thai law has moved towards a French definition of an 
administrative contract59 as an agreement ‘that relates to the public 
service and that reserves exceptional powers to the administration’ 
(Brown and Bell, 1998: 202). The Supreme Administrative court in Thai-
land has defined such a contract as where:  
[A]n administrative agency or the person authorised by the state agrees 
with the other party undertaking or participating in the undertaking of 
public services, or it must be a contract containing peculiar provisions 
demonstrating the privilege of the state so that the exercise of adminis-
trative powers or the carrying out of administrative activities –  
public services – can achieve their purposes. (Resolution of the General 
Assembly of Judges of the Supreme Administrative Court, 6/2544, 10 
October 2001: 32) 
 In many cases contracts will be administrative in character, that is, 
concerned with the management of public services or to do with public 
construction projects.60 However, another key characteristic is that such 
agreements are reached between ‘unequal parties’. Often a special feature 
of administrative contracts is the power resting with public bodies to vary 
contractual terms unilaterally, subject to certain conditions. The 
restricted right afforded to administrative agencies to enter into contracts 
is normally dictated by primary or secondary legislation. This is a factor 
which has to be taken into account when looking at the formation of 
administrative contracts. For example, in Thailand many government 
procurement contracts require certain procedures to be followed, which 
vary in accordance with the sums involved. The state, in the form of the 
administrative agency, is often granted special powers to supervise the 
performance of the contract (Bhalakula, 2003: 12). The determination of 
whether a matter falls under the definition of an administrative contract 
is of considerable importance, as the extent of the liabilities of the parties 
will often be greater under a private civil contract than under an adminis-
trative contract. A civil claim under private law would normally permit 
recovery in full, whereas under an administrative contract adjustment 
may be made in accordance with the detailed circumstances of the case.61  
 An additional important point to note is that the jurisdiction over 
administrative contracts overlaps to some extent with other levels of 
dispute resolution (Okanurak and Yiamsamatha, 2004). In Thailand the 
Civil Procedure Code (Chapter 3, ss 210–222)62 allows a dispute over an 
administrative contract to be settled by means of arbitration. This consti-
tutes a significant divergence from the French position, where recourse to 
arbitration is specifically prohibited. However, it has been held by the 
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Thai Administrative Court that, in situations where an administrative 
contract provides for settlement by arbitration, a case will not be heard 
until the arbitration process has been exhausted (Case No Red 1454/2001 
and Case No 1799/2001).  
Provisional Assessment of the Performance of the 
Administrative Courts 
Since its inception in 2001, the impact of the court can be assessed in two 
ways. First, there are some statistics available relating to the work load. 
Second, it is possible to highlight particular cases with political, constitu-
tional or legal significance that have tested the independence of a court 
faced with external pressures and which demonstrate whether an 
effective remedy is provided for the citizen. Turning first to throughput, 
the figures which are available reveal a significant case load.63 Between 
March 2000 and November 2005 a total of 21,251 cases were referred to 
the courts of first instance, out of which 15,891 had been determined. 
There were 5360 cases waiting to be heard, while a further 5610 cases had 
been referred to the Supreme Administrative Court over the same period; 
of these, 3702 had been determined, with 1908 cases still outstanding.  
 The table opposite shows the distribution of cases commenced against 
the various government departments and public bodies. The figures reveal 
that a total of 1879 cases have been initiated against the National Police 
Bureau. Not far behind is the Bangkok Metropolitan Administration, with 
1690 cases, and the Land Bureau, with 1514 cases. Highways and Local 
Administration feature next with around 1000 cases each, while it may 
appear surprising that only 184 cases have been filed against the Office of 
Public Health. However, these statistics do not indicate the subject-matter 
of these actions. So, for example, it is not possible to discover what propor-
tion of the case load concerns issues relating to administrative contracts of 
public employees, as opposed to issues to do with legality, or cases seeking 
damages against governmental bodies. Furthermore, in some fields there 
may be overlapping jurisdictions and alternative remedies available. 
Nevertheless, from these statistics it is apparent that the Administrative 
Courts have an important role in hearing a substantial number of cases 
that fall within its jurisdiction. 
 Turning next to consider a small sample of significant but diverse 
cases, it becomes clear that the Administrative Courts not only provide 
remedial action but also have proved resistant to external influence, so 
that the institution has gained a reputation for independence (The Nation, 
30 December 2005).  
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Ministerial departments attacked in administrative cases at the  
Central Administrative Court (as of 31 October 2005) 
Vol of cases 
No Department Ministry 
2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 Total 
1  National Police Bureau Prime Minister Office 648 391 306 295 239 1879 
2 Bangkok Metropolitan Administration   368 241 398 408 275 1690 
3 Land Department Ministry of Interior 675 301 221 154 163 1514 
4 Highways Department Ministry of Transports 446 190 166 81 52 935 
5 Department of Local Administration 
Ministry of 
Interior 528 184 86 66 49 913 
6 Office of the Secretary to the Minister 
Ministry of 
Transports 255 97 194 114 170 830 
7 Tambol Administration Local Government 386 132 92 87 62 759 
8 Office of the Permanent Secretary for Interior 
Ministry of 
Interior 359 153 92 83 67 754 
9 Office of the Commission for Higher Education 
Ministry of 
Education 200 125 113 107 131 676 
10 Office of the Secretary to the Minister 
Ministry of 
Interior 137 121 157 127 95 637 
11 




Education 263 103 83 22 39 510 
12 The Royal Irrigation Department 
Ministry of 
Agriculture 214 141 38 56 29 478 
13 Tambol Municipality Local Government 171 73 47 34 33 358 
14 Department of Town and Country Planning 
Ministry of 
Interior 141 114 32 8 10 305 
15 Office of the Secretary to the Minister 
Ministry of 
Education 63 42 58 56 119 338 
16 Agricultural Land Reform Office 
Ministry of 
Agriculture 80 164 20 9 9 282 
17 Office of the Secretary to the Minister 
Ministry of 
Finance 86 32 17 28 75 238 
18 Office of the Secretary to the Minister 
Ministry of 
Public Health 42 49 49 46 14 200 
19 Revenue Department Ministry of Finance 81 33 45 29 10 198 
20 Office of the Permanent Secretary for Public Health 
Ministry of 
Public Health 88 27 23 30 16 184 
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 To date, the most prominent decision has been in the Egat case, in 
which the Supreme Administrative Court ruled against the government 
(The Nation, 16 November 2005a; Arnold, 2005). In this case, the  
Thai Government was proposing to privatise the Electricity Generating 
Authority of Thailand (Egat) Egat Plc. A combination of 11 civic pressure 
groups, including the Campaign for Popular Democracy, the Consumer 
Protection Foundation, the Federation of Consumer Organisations, and 
representatives from the Egat labour unions, with the support of opposi-
tion parties, contested the government’s privatisation plans. The objectors 
argued that the proposals were likely to result in greatly increased 
electricity prices for electricity consumers, while giving disproportionate 
financial rewards to a small group of investors, including politicians with 
an interest in the scheme who stood to gain directly from the privati-
sation. The Prime Minister, Thaksin Shinawatra, and Energy Minister, 
Viset Choopiban, were among the five named defendants. It was alleged 
that there had been an abuse of power because the government was 
proceeding with the privatisation without any form of public consultation, 
that is, despite the fact that mandatory hearings were required before 
implementing such a proposal. Further, it was argued that the sale of 
Egat shares violated the Constitution,64 because the government had 
illegally used two royal decrees to appoint a panel to oversee electricity 
generation. It was also argued that there were inadequate safeguards for 
consumers with regard to pricing levels and standards of service. The 
court found in favour of the objectors and issued an injunction which 
prevented the privatisation from going ahead before hearings had taken 
place. The decision had far-reaching ramifications. In economic terms, the 
interruption of the schedule for flotation in a market-sensitive area depen-
dent on investor confidence called into question the financial viability of 
the entire scheme. At a political level, the anti-privatisation campaign had 
developed into a personal campaign against the Prime Minister. Indeed, 
the court’s decision was a serious blow to a central plank of government 
policy. The fact that fundamental principles of legality were upheld by the 
court, especially given the extremely sensitive issues at stake in the case, 
provides a clear demonstration that, in this area at least, the new Consti-
tution has managed to establish a powerfully independent watchdog body 
capable of checking abuses of power (The Nation, 17 November 2005).  
 Furthermore, it is of enormous constitutional significance that the 
conduct of the Thai Election Commission (EC) in relation to the election 
held on 2 April 2006 and by-elections scheduled for 29 April 2006 were 
subject to judicial challenges in the Constitutional Court and the Supreme 
Administrative Court. The main opposition parties in Thailand boycotted 
the 2006 election but, at the same time, they contested the legality of the 
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poll on the grounds that there had been a breach of electoral laws, and 
that the Election Commission had failed to discharge its constitutional 
duty when overseeing the electoral process.65 In an unprecedented 
response, King Bhumibol intervened personally to defuse an escalating 
political crisis.66 In recognition of the fact that the immediate issues 
regarding the election required judicial resolution, he addressed all the 
judges of the Constitutional Court67 and Administrative Courts directly 
(The Observer, 30 April 2006), urging them to assert their authority under 
the Constitution, and in particular to do so by invalidating the 2006 
election (BBC News Website, 28 April 2006; The Nation, 1 May 2006). 
Subsequently, the Constitutional Court ruled on 8 May 2006 that the 
general election was void and that it would have to be held again (BBC 
News Website, 8 May 2006; The Guardian, 8 May 2006). 
 There have been other notable decisions where the court has taken a 
robust stance in relation to the functioning of public bodies. For example, 
in March 2003, the Supreme Administrative Court upheld an earlier 
ruling by the Administrative Court regarding the selection process for the 
National Broadcasting Commission (NBC). The selection of 14 candidates 
for the NBC was nullified by court order on the grounds that the selection 
committee had been partisan and not independent as required under the 
administrative code (The Nation, 5 March 2003). The court ruled that as 
the selection committee had been set up under the National Broadcasting 
Act it was a government agency, and therefore bound to comply with the 
Administrative Code, which prohibits conflicts of interest. This decision of 
the court resulted in a re-run of the selection process. However, despite 
the earlier ruling, many of the same figures with alleged conflicts of 
interest appeared on the revised list (McCargo and Pathmanand, 2005: 
46). There was an unsatisfactory outcome in this instance, which permit-
ted a continued conflict of interests, because in setting up this public body 
the other constitutional players responsible for appointing the selection 
committee chose to ignore the rules that had been set out through the 
earlier judicial intervention, and so the names of disqualified candidates 
re-appeared (Phongpaicit and Baker, 2005: 151, 207).  
 Likewise, the Administrative Courts may be routinely called upon to 
rule on the extent of the legal powers of other constitutional organs  
that themselves have an oversight function. For example, in 2002 the 
Administrative Court held that another watchdog body, the Anti-Money 
Laundering Office, had acted unlawfully by inquiring into the bank 
transactions of journalists who had been critical of the Thaksin Govern-
ment. This later resulted in the journalists filing a compensation claim 
with the court (The Nation, 11 March 2003).  
 In an entirely different context, the Administrative Courts have been 
called upon to determine the legality of revocations of citizenship. For 
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example, following a decision by the Local Administration Department 
(LAD) to remove the citizenship of 1243 villagers in the Mae Ai district, 
the individuals concerned became ineligible to receive services from state 
agencies, including the Bt 30 universal healthcare scheme, or to apply for 
loans from state financial institutions. Deprived of their citizenship, some 
students were forced to leave school. In April 2002, the Chiang Mai 
Administrative Court found that the LAD had acted unlawfully when it 
revoked the citizenship of these villagers. After the LAD appealed, the 
Supreme Administrative Court in September 2005 confirmed the original 
decision of the Chiang Mai Administrative Court, resulting in the 
villagers enjoying automatic reinstatement of their Thai nationality, and 
the bringing to a close a three-year legal ordeal for the villagers (The 
Nation, 11 September, 2005). In yet another field, the Central Adminis-
trative Court has dealt with negligence claims taken out against public 
authorities. For example, in a widely publicised case, after a judge found 
that the Office of Atomic Energy for Peace had been negligent in not 
strictly enforcing safety regulations in the storage of radioactive mate-
rials, the court awarded compensation of Bt 5.2 million to 12 victims of a 
Cobalt-60 radiation leak (The Nation, 28 September 2002). Last, from the 
earlier discussion of grounds of review, it will already be apparent that 
the Administrative Courts can dispose of procedural matters concerning 
unlawful discrimination and unfair treatment at the hands of public 
bodies.68  
Conclusion 
The Administrative Courts in Thailand comprise an important part of the 
new grievance machinery introduced under the 1997 Constitution. These 
courts have been assigned a distinct administrative law jurisdiction, to 
ensure that the rules of the game are complied with and that the various 
constitutional players perform their duties as intended. In terms of their 
conception, the model for these Administrative Courts has been strongly 
influenced by the French droit administratif and the Conseil d’Etat and 
the courts have many exemplary features. There has, for example, been a 
genuine attempt to give them independence. They are staffed by profes-
sional judges with experience of law and administration. In the main, they 
have construed their jurisdiction widely, to take account of the contracting 
state and the interplay of public and private involvement in service deli-
very (more widely than the administrative court in the United Kingdom). 
Further, they have at their disposal a formidable set of remedies capable 
of coping with the diverse forms of administrative abuse and allowing the 
courts to provide compensation for breach of contract and other forms of 
wrongdoing.  
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 However, although these positive features have allowed the Adminis-
trative Courts to make an active contribution by providing redress, it 
should be recognised that the 1997 Constitution has been beset with deep-
seated problems. In a practical sense, the Administrative Courts are 
intended to work in harness with a battery of other independent watchdog 
bodies69 to eliminate the abuses that plagued the Thai system of govern-
ment. The loosely defined remit of such bodies means they are prone to 
overlap, with turf wars resulting. At the formal level, there needs to be a 
rationalisation of functions and a clearer delineation of respective juris-
dictions to achieve greater clarity. At the informal level, conventions need 
to develop to allow the division of responsibilities to fall into place.  
 More fundamentally, there are signs that the constitutional reform 
process itself is being undermined, because the players are not conforming 
to the rules. It should be remembered that the severe economic slump of 
the 1990s provided the impetus for the introduction of the 1997 Constitu-
tion. The Thai nation was confronted with a grave economic crisis. An 
important aspect of the response was a widely shared recognition among 
politicians and other elite groups of the need to follow an entirely  
new path, in order to eliminate the endemic corruption associated with 
the past. Sufficient consensus emerged to allow the introduction of a 
constitution with custom-designed bodies directed at achieving this task 
(McCargo, 2002: 6). In consequence, the political game had a revised set of 
rules. It also had the new complement of (in relative terms) independent 
referees, including, at a judicial level, a Constitutional Court and the 
Administrative Courts, to ensure that the new rules would be adequately 
enforced.  
 Two further aspects in particular can be singled out, however, where 
there is evidence of a regression to previous habits. The first concerns the 
constantly recurring issue of conflicts of interest, particularly relating to 
the system of appointments to public bodies and the awarding of 
concessions and contracts. For example, the case concerning appointments 
to the NBC has illustrated the limits of the system in circumstances when 
the participants operating in an administrative context choose to ignore 
the requirements of the law as set out in a judgment. The constitutional 
watchdog bodies have yet to intervene decisively to remove conflicts of 
interest where suspicion has arisen, and this failure has led to a 
continuing perception that corrupt practices are able to continue. The 
second issue concerns the conduct of the watchdog bodies themselves in 
relation to the salaries they receive. On the one hand, to attract qualified 
candidates, and place the judges and officials above temptation, a rela-
tively high rate of remuneration is justified. On the other hand, if these 
bodies are seen to be feathering their own nest, it does terrific damage to 
the credibility of the Constitution.  
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 I believe that, to achieve substantial progress, the consensus which 
led to the introduction of the reforms in the first place needs to be revived. 
Strong political leadership is required to reiterate the genuine values  
on which reform was originally based. The written constitutional and 
administrative law framework is already in place; what is needed now is a 
strong convention of compliance that is accepted by all the main partici-
pants in the constitutional game. 
Postscript 
As this article was about to go to press in September 2006, Thailand 
experienced a military coup which has removed the Prime Minister and 
placed the nation under military control after a period of political turmoil. 
The politicians were evidently not adhering to the rules of the game and 
the generals, with the apparent approval of the King, have finally tipped 
over the board bringing the present game to an end.  
 However, this is not likely to result in a re-imposition of military 
dictatorship. An imminent return to civilian rule has been promised within 
a year, along with new elections and a revised constitution. Despite 
obvious shortcomings relating to conflicts of interest, the 1997 Constitu-
tion with its battery of watchdog bodies was a significant attempt to 
entrench the rule of law and to establish principles of liberal democracy. In 
the coming months as further constitutional modifications are discussed, it 
will be important to address previous deficiencies as well as building on 
the foundations which have been laid. The system of administrative courts 
discussed in this article (and the Thai ombudsman) will almost certainly 
survive as important legacies of the latest Thai constitutional episode.  
Notes 
 *  Professor of Law, London Metropolitan University. I would like to express my sincere 
thanks to his Honour Judge Dr Vishnu Varunyou, Professor Andrew Harding and 
Professor John Bell for their very helpful comments on earlier drafts of this article. 
 1 The term ‘genealogy’ is deliberately used here in the Foucauldian sense:  
What [genealogy] really does is to entertain the claims to attention of local, discon-
tinuous, disqualified, illegitimate knowledges against the claims of a unitary body of 
theory which would filter, hierarchise and order them in the name of some true 
knowledge and some arbitrary idea of what constitutes science and its objects’: 
Foucault, 1980: 83.  
  Or in other words, ‘the sociology of law as governance involves the compilation of social 
facts in order not to make sense of the present, but as a constant demonstration that 
the present is nothing special, that it is what it is, a collection of contingencies, in some 
ways unique, in some ways as other eras’: Hunt and Wickham, 1994: 119.  
 2 See Wade and Forsyth, 2004 as an exemplar of the UK court-centred approach; for 
example, ‘[t]he primary purpose of administrative law ... is to keep the powers of the 
government within their legal bounds’: Wade and Forsyth, 2004: 5.  
 3 For example, a principle of legality for administrators and the need for fair procedures. 
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 4 For example, there was an awareness of the recently adopted South African 
Constitution during the drafting process of the Thai Constitution but any common 
features were adopted on a ‘pick and mix’ basis.  
 5 The Constitutional Court rules on the constitutionality of organic laws, laws, regu-
lations, draft laws and regulations, resolutions made be political parties, status of the 
members of the House of Representatives and the Senate, actions of governmental 
organisations which may infringe upon basic rights and freedoms of the people, legal 
cases referred to by the courts of justice as provided under s 264 of the Constitution, 
status of Cabinet members and members of the Election Commission, conflicting juris-
diction of conflicting Constitutional bodies and questions referred to it by the National 
Counter Corruption Commission and the Ombudsman.  
 6 Under s 268 of the Thai Constitution: ‘The decision of the Constitutional Court shall be 
deemed final and binding on the National Assembly, Council of Ministers, Courts and 
other State organs’. 
 7 Since the limits of its authority are not clearly defined in the Constitution it is unclear 
whether the Constitutional Court is at the pinnacle of a hierarchy of jurisdictions or 
merely one jurisdiction amongst others. This has become a matter of important debate 
in Thailand because it has a direct bearing on the limits of other jurisdictions. Although 
the majority of jurists do not see the Constitutional Court as having higher authority, 
the Constitutional Court has recently agreed to hear a case brought by the Electoral 
Commission contesting a decision by the Supreme Administrative Court. 
 8 For example, Sanan Kachonprasot brought a case against the Prime Minister, Thaksin 
Shinawatra, before the National Counter Corruption Commission alleging a conceal-
ment of assets. The Anti-Corruption Commission upheld the allegations which left a 15-
member panel of the Constitutional Court to finally decide whether he was guilty as 
charged. It decided on 3 August 2001 to acquit on a decision split 8–7. The Prime 
Minister subsequently criticised the Constitutional Court and declared that the inde-
pendent bodies should have their powers curtailed. Moreover, a petition was later filed 
demanding the removal of four Constitutional Court judges. It appears that the due 
process required under the Constitution had been tested to breaking point and was not 
able to withstand a judgment by the Constitutional Court that would have disqualified 
an elected leader: Chambers, 2002: 28ff. 
 9 Section 9(6) of the 1999 Act provides that the following matters are not within the 
jurisdiction of the Administrative Courts: 
 (i) action concerning military discipline; 
 (ii) action of the Judicial Commission under the law on judicial service; 
 (iii) cases within the jurisdiction of the Juvenile and Family Courts, Labour Courts, 
Tax Courts, Intellectual Property and International Trade Courts, Bankruptcy 
Courts or other specialised courts. 
 10 The Judicial Commission is an organisation established by the Law of Judicial Organi-
sation which deals with administration relating to the judges of the civil and criminal 
courts.  
 11 While in France the droit administratif evolved according to its own rules, in Germany 
administrative law emanates from the Constitution itself. There is a basic assumption 
under the principle of Rechtstaat that the exercise of all state authority must have a 
legal basis. 
 12 The French Council of State (Conseil D’Etat) originated from the Conseil du Roi or 
Curia Regis which was well established in customary law countries in continental 
Europe. See Brown and Bell, 1998: 5. 
 13 Following the Franks Report the Tribunals and Inquiries Act 1958 set in place prin-
ciples under which tribunals operated and allowed appeals from tribunals to courts on 
points of law.  
 14 In R v Inland Revenue Commissioners, ex p National Federation for the Self Employed 
[1982] AC 617 at 641, Lord Diplock famously remarked: ‘The progress towards a 
comprehensive system of administrative law … I regard as having been the greatest 
achievement of the English courts in my judicial lifetime’.  
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 15 The use of the term ‘administrative law’ instead of ‘constitutional law’ was more 
acceptable during the period of absolute monarchy. 
 16 There were attempts by judges to influence the drafting commission of the present 
constitution to prevent the creation of a separate Administrative Court.  
 17 It should be noted that Jean-Michel Galabert, former Président de la section du Rapport 
et des Études au Conseil d’Etat, played a part in the introduction of the Thai 
Administrative Courts. See Galabert, 2000: 700. 
 18 See Thai Constitution Part 4, s 276 which provides that:  
Administrative Courts have the powers to try and adjudicate cases of dispute 
between a State agency, State enterprise, local government organisation, or State 
official under the superintendence or supervision of the Government on one part and 
a private individual on the other part, or between State agency, State enterprise, 
local government organisation, or State official under the superintendence or super-
vision of the Government on one part and another agency, enterprise, organisation or 
official on the other part, which is the dispute as a consequence of the act or omission 
of the act that must be, according to the law, performed by such State agency, State 
enterprise, local government organisation, or State official, or as a consequence of the 
act or omission of the act under the responsibility of such State Agency, State Enter-
prise, local government organisation or State official in the performance of duties 
under the law, as provided by law. There shall be the Supreme Administrative Court 
and Administrative Courts of First Instance, and there may also be the Appellate 
Administrative Court.  
 19 In 1972 a decree that the Minister for Justice would become involved in the adminis-
tration of the judiciary was withdrawn following protests. The 1991 Constitution, apart 
from explicitly requiring that judges shall be independent in their judicial capacity, 
safeguards judicial independence by disqualifying political official from becoming 
judges, prohibiting the establishment of special courts to replace existing courts and 
preventing the enactment of any law taking away the jurisdiction of a court in relation 
to any case (see ss 188–191). See McDorman, 1995: 257–98.  
 20 See the United Kingdom Constitutional Reform Act 2005 which sets up a Judicial 
Appointments Commission for England and Wales whose recommendations must then 
be approved by the Minister of Constitutional Affairs; and see arts 64, 65 and 66 of the 
French Constitution in regard to judges but the Conseil D’Etat consists of what are 
really special civil servants schooled in administration and recruited by examination or 
experience.  
 21 To qualify, a candidate must show service for at least three years as: petition com-
missioner or secretary to law councillors in the Office of the Council of State; 
Administrative Court official; judge of the civil court, criminal court or central military 
court; provincial public prosecutor; level-8 government official; associate professor in 
higher education in law, political science, public administration or social science. Also 
Masters graduates with 10 years’ public service and doctoral graduates with six years’ 
public service and attorneys with 12 years’ experience are eligible as candidates.  
 22 In France judges of the administrative courts are recruited in two ways, the predomi-
nant method is from the National School of Administration which has acted as a 
training ground but they are also recruited from le tour exterieure. These are judges 
that have distinguished themselves as administrators and latterly by competitive 
examination 
 23 Judges cannot be permanent government officials; employees of a state agency; holders 
of political position, directors of a state enterprise or state agency; director, manager or 
consultant with a partnership or company; acting as attorney or other professional 
capacity. However, it should be noted that in France the secondment into the 
administrative courts and to the administrative courts of appeal applies to civil 
servants recruited through L’ENA (Ecole Nationale d’Administration). See <http://www. 
ena.fr/index.php?page=formation/initiale/metiers/juridictions>.  
 24 Salary levels for judges are openly published. See the English version of the 1999 Act.  
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 25 The acceptance of a separate public jurisdiction based on the recognition of the distinct 
objectives of public law has been integral to the French system. See, for example, Auby 
and Ducos-Ader, 1966: 1–7 in Rudden, 1991: 14.  
 26 It has been pointed out that, in France, ‘[t]he key decision of the French Tribunal des 
Conflits in Blanco (1873) established the function criterion of service publique to define 
the boundary between the administrative jurisdiction and regular jurisdiction’. See 
Cane, 2003: 253.  
 27 I am very grateful to his honour Judge Dr Vishnu Varunyou for clarifying these and 
other matters during a meeting in Bangkok, 5 January 2005.  
 28 See Lord Diplock’s discussion of these issues in O’Reilly v Mackman [1983] 2 AC 237.  
 29 In 2000 as part of the reforms to civil procedure the prerogative remedies were renamed 
to clarify their function. Certiorari is a quashing order, prohibition becomes a 
prohibiting order and mandamus is called a mandating order.  
 30 For example, in March 2003, the Office of Consumer Protection Board issued regula-
tions banning the sale of high-pressure water guns which, following commercial 
pressure, were considered to be unlawful by the Administrative Court but remained in 
operation pending an appeal. See The Nation, April 13, 2004. 
 31 Enforcement through astreinte is a comparatively recent development in France, first 
introduced by the law of 16 July 1980 and it became available to the Cours 
Administratives d’Appel and the Tribunaux Administratifs from 1995 (see Brown and 
Bell, 1998: 116). Astreinte is a court order requiring a person in breach of an obligation 
to pay a sum of money to an innocent party: Rudden 1991: 507.  
 32 The ground of qualification juridique des faits requires that proper inferences have been 
drawn from the facts. 
 33 This approximates to the permission stage in an application for judicial review, which is 
usually a form-filling exercise to allow a judge to consider: first, whether the procedural 
requirements relating to time limits, locus standi and public as opposed to private 
issues are satisfied; and, second, to assess whether there is an arguable case based on 
the alleged grounds.  
 34 1999 Act, s 57. ‘In the case where an administrative agency or State official fails to take 
action within the time specified or shows such conduct as indicative of prolonging the 
case, the Administrative Court shall report to the superior, superintendent, supervisor 
or Prime Minister for proceeding with corrective action, giving directions or taking a 
disciplinary action, without prejudice to the power of the Court to inflict a punishment 
by reason of a contempt of court’. 
 35 In France, there is a heavy reliance on documents. Witnesses only give evidence in a 
separate procedure in advance of the final hearing.  
 36 In 2001 and 2002, the Central Administrative Court dealt with a total of 3933 cases and 
the Supreme Administrative Court with 642 cases. See table in Bureekul and 
Thananithichut, 2004: 14.  
 37 For example, it is provided in respect of administrative contracts that where arbitration 
is part of the contract this option has to be exhausted before recourse to the 
Administrative Court.  
 38 Rule of the General Assembly of Judges of the Supreme Administrative Court on 
Administrative Procedure BE 2543 (2000), cl 37.  
 39 See s 9(1) ‘in relation to an unlawful act by an administrative agency or State official, 
whether in connection with the issuance of a by-law or order or in connection with other 
act, by reason of acting without or beyond the scope of the powers and duties or 
inconsistently with the law or the form, process or procedure which is the material 
requirement for such act or in bad faith or in a manner indicating unfair discrimination 
or causing unnecessary process or excessive burden to the public or amounting to under 
exercise of discretion’. 
 40 For example, in a ruling on 15 February 2005 the Administrative Court criticised the 
Anti-Money Laundering Office for launching an unlawful investigation into five political 
activists in 2001. ‘This court finds that AMLO exercised its discretion to launch the 
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investigation without allowing due process’. No financial penalty was granted against 
AMLO because the wrongdoing was detected and cancelled before any damage has been 
caused. See The Nation, 19 February 2005. 
 41 See Padfield v Minister of Agriculture Fisheries and Food [1968] AC 997 at 1030 where 
Lord Reid that ‘the policy and objects of the Act must be determined by construing the 
Act as a whole and the construction is always a matter of law for the court’. 
 42 Article 30 of the Constitution provides: ‘All persons are equal before the law and shall 
enjoy equal protection under the law. Men and women shall enjoy equal rights. Unjust 
discrimination against a person on the grounds of the difference in origin, race, 
language, sex, age, physical or health condition, personal status, economic or social 
standing, religious belief, education or constitutionally political view, shall not be 
permitted’. 
 43 Article 3 of the German Constitution. See Foster, 1996: 160–1: where it is noted that ‘a 
number of general principles have been derived from the equality principle, such as 
equal access to public benefits, especially in the field of education, the principle of tax 
equity …, and the equality of arms in legal procedure …’. 
 44 For example, Sirimit Boon-mul, a physically challenged lawyer, successfully appealed to 
the Supreme Administrative Court after the State Attorney Commission rejected a job 
application in 2001 on the grounds that he was incapable of performing the job due to a 
physical impairment. The decision of the court gave him the right to reapply for a job as 
a state attorney. See The Nation, 15 February 2005.  
 45 Violation de la loi as a ground also includes errors of law, using the wrong text, or 
misinterpretation of the law. 
 46 The concept of competence liée is explained further in Brown and Bell, 1998: 244ff, 253ff. 
 47 Although it has also been acknowledged under the common law that there are occasions 
where a statutory discretion is so widely drawn that it might only be challenged if 
exercised irrationally or in bad faith. See Padfield v Minister of Agriculture Fisheries 
and Food [1968] AC 997. 
 48 See Wade and Forsyth, 2004: 356. In Padfield v Minister of Agriculture, Fisheries and 
Food [1968] AC 997 at 1030, Lord Reid rejected the all-or-nothing approach to the 
exercise of unfettered discretion and commented: ‘Parliament must have conferred the 
discretion with the intention that it should be used to promote the policy and objects of 
the act’. 
 49 For example, it was reported in The Nation, 1 June 2004, that the Khon Kaen Adminis-
trative Court heard the case of a Loei hospital director, Dr Kriengsak Vacharanu-
kulkiete, who was removed for criticising his superiors at the Public Health Ministry. It 
was argued that an order for his removal to take effect within seven days was unfair. 
 50 The Conseil d’Etat exercises an advisory function for the administration as well as 
acting in a separate capacity in a role where it adjudicates over the administration. This 
aspect is referred to as the section contentieux. It is worth remembering the Diceyan 
critique of the droit administratif which concentrated on the fact that the adminis-
trative court was part of the administration.  
 51 Under 9(2) ‘involving a dispute in relation to an administrative agency or State official 
neglecting official duties required by the law to be performed or performing such duties 
with unreasonable delay’.  
 52 For example, the Office of Atomic Energy for Peace (OAEP). OAEP was found negligent 
in the storage of spent isotopes around the country and was ordered by the Central 
Administrative Court in 2002 to pay Bt 5.2 million to 12 survivors of the radiation leak: 
see The Nation, 10 August 2004.  
 53 Under 9(3) ‘involving a dispute in relation to a wrongful act or other liability of an 
administrative agency or State official arising from the exercise of power under the law 
or from a by-law, administrative order or other order, or from neglect of official duties 
required by the law to be performed or the performance of such duties with unrea-
sonable delay’.  
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 54 Rule of the General Assembly of Judges of the Supreme Administrative Court on 
Administrative Court Procedure BE 2543 (2000), cl 28: ‘The referral by an Ombudsman 
of a matter, together with the opinions thereon, to the Court in the case where the 
Ombudsman is of the opinion that any by-law or act of an administrative agency or 
State official is unlawful …’. For further discussion of the role of the Thai Ombudsmen, 
see generally Leyland, 2006.  
 55 Section 9(5) provides: ‘The case prescribed by law to be submitted to the Court by an 
administrative agency or State official for mandating a person to do a particular act or 
refraining therefrom’.  
 56 Misfeasance in public office can be defined as: ‘even where there is no ministerial duty 
… and even where no recognised tort such as trespass, nuisance or negligence is 
committed, public authorities may be liable in damages for malicious, deliberate or 
injurious wrong-doing’: Wade and Forsyth, 2004 : 781. 
 57 In respect of the conduct of local government under the fiduciary principle, a local 
authority is regarded as a trustee of money it receives from local taxpayers. The District 
Auditor used to be vested with special powers of surcharging to deal with wrongdoing 
associated with local councils and local councillors, but there are no sanctions available 
under the Local Government Act 2000. Surcharging was abolished under the Local 
Government Act 2000 s 90: see Leigh, 2000: 121. 
 58 Section 9(4). It should also be noted that under s 9(3) the Administrative Court is 
granted jurisdiction over ‘wrongful acts’ which can be understood in common law terms 
as for cases concerning public bodies which concern tort liability. See generally 
Bhalakula, 2003.  
 59 The French jurisdiction has required a distinction to be made between actes d’autorité 
and acte de gestion. The jurisdiction of the administrative court only extends to actes de 
gestion. Contracts made by the state with private individuals were considered actes de 
gestion. A recent innovation in France has been to introduce a procurement code and to 
consider any contracts made in accordance with the code administrative contracts. 
 60 In Thailand there are five principal procedures of government procurement: price 
agreement; price inquiry; invitation for bidding; special procedure; and special case 
procedure. See Rule of the Office of the Prime Minister on Procurement 1992 and Act on 
Private Participation in State Undertakings 1992.  
 61 Petition Council No 70/1992 is cited as an example by Bhalakula, 2003: 24.  
 62 See further s 15 of Thai Arbitration Act BE 2545 (2002) which specifically provides that 
in an agreement between a governmental agency and a private party, the parties may 
agree to resolve any disputes pertaining to the agreement by means of arbitration, and 
that such arbitration agreement shall be binding on the parties. 
 63 These figures were supplied by the Thai Administrative Court.  
 64 The Ombudsman stated that he would forward the matter to the Constitution Court if 
he had grounds for believing the scheme was unconstitutional: The Nation, 16 Novem-
ber 2005b.  
 65 The Thai electoral law provides that contestants in single candidate seats must win 20 
per cent of eligible votes to get elected and that all seats must be filled for parliament to 
meet. Thirty-eight seats were unfilled following the April 2006 election and, after 
further by-elections, 14 remained vacant.  
 66 The occasional previous political interventions by the King have not been in relation to 
the judiciary. Despite the fact that he is a constitutional monarch his involvement has 
not attracted criticism within Thailand. 
 67 The Constitutional Court failed to uphold the clear finding of wrongdoing against the 
Prime Minister after investigations by the National Counter Corruption Commission in 
2001, which led to allegations that the impartiality of some of the judges on the 
Constitutional Court had been compromised. See n 8 above. 
 68 See text at nn 44–49 above. 
 69 These include the Constitutional Court, National Counter Corruption Commission, 
Election Commission, Anti-Money Laundering Office, Parliament Ombudsman and 
National Human Rights Commission. 
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